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The uncertainty surrounding pre-nuptial agreements is still very much present, and the issues 
presented in Brack v Brack [2018] EWCA Civ 2826 required the Court of Appeal to deliver 
yet further judicial clarification. The Swedish couple married on 29 December 2000, following 
6 years of living together. Their marriage broke down in 2014. They had two children during 
the course of their marriage, and they had lived in the United States, Belgium and most recently 
in the United Kingdom. The husband was a successful racing driver, the wife took on the role 
of homemaker following the birth of their children. Each spouse had made different but equal 
contributions to their marriage. The couple had accumulated just under £11 million during the 
course of their relationship.  
Within the five months leading up to their marriage, the couple created three prenuptial 
agreements and the case refers to these by the location in which they were signed. The first 
agreement, ‘the Niagara agreement’, was dated 10 July 2000, and their third and final 
agreement, ‘the Gothenburg agreement’, was dated 26 December 2000. The Court of Appeal 
describe these as having ‘identical terms’ for all relevant purposes (para [15]). Each of these 
agreements contained the prorogation agreement (an agreement on jurisdiction) with the aim 
to ensure Swedish law would be applied to the distribution of property. These two agreements 
set out that each party would maintain their own private property and have no right to 
community property or other joint property rights. The second agreement, ‘the Ohio 
agreement’ was entered into on 11 December 2000. This was a much lengthier agreement, and 
notably the wife had been advised that this agreement was unfair, but signed it nevertheless. 
The agreement set out how the matrimonial home should be dealt with and contained a clause 
by which each party would relinquish all claims in the event of the termination of the marriage. 
The effect of this agreement would have been that the wife would have waived any right to 
maintenance for herself, and been left with one half of the value of the matrimonial home, 
which amounted to around 5% of the family assets  The choice of jurisdiction was also set out 
as Sweden in this agreement.  
In the High Court, Mr Justice Francis considered the terms of the agreements to be unfair as 
they did not provide for the needs of the wife or the children. The wife’s claim regarding 
misrepresentation was rejected, with the result that no vitiating factors were found to be 
present. The judge’s reasoning led him to conclude that he was unable to go beyond provision 
for the wife’s needs. Yet due to the existence of a valid prorogation clause, he was unable to 
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make even a needs-based order. Instead, he decided that he still had jurisdiction over strict 
property rights, whereby the wife would be entitled to her half of the matrimonial home. The 
wife appealed to the Court of Appeal.  
The appeal raised two issues. Firstly, the question was raised as to whether there was a valid 
prorogation clause within the agreements. Second, and more importantly in terms of refining 
the general principles in this area, the question was raised as to whether a court was limited to 
making an order limited to needs where an agreement, free from any vitiating factors, is present 
in a given case.  
Regarding prorogation, both parties agreed that the only possible valid clause could be found 
in the Ohio agreement as it was settled that neither the Niagara agreement nor the Gothenburg 
agreement were deemed to be enforceable under Swedish law. This was because the 
jurisdiction clause related to matrimonial property, and this is not permitted under Swedish 
law. The upshot of the Court of Appeal’s assessment of the Ohio agreement resulted in the 
court concluding that the parties had failed to create a valid clause due to problematic drafting. 
Lady Justice King commented:  
‘a choice of jurisdiction clause is simple to draft in clear unambiguous terms, and the necessary consensus 
will have been established once committed to an agreement. Failure to express a choice of jurisdiction in 
unambiguous terms can result, as here, in international jurisdictional disarray leading to delay and lengthy, 
complex litigation at extortionate cost.’ (para. [75]).  
This part of the judgement is significant for practitioners and acts as a stark reminder of the 
importance of clear drafting.  
The position with regard to the needs-based order had narrowed to the point where there was 
consensus between the parties that where an agreement is free from vitiating factors a judge is 
entitled to take into account needs, compensation and sharing. The question remained however 
as to what limits, if any, the judge should take into account when undertaking a fresh 
assessment of the wife’s claim for financial remedies. Counsel for the wife argued that the 
judge had made an error in law by concluding that he was constrained to consider the case on 
the basis of needs only. Conversely, counsel for the husband took the view that the judge had 
not made an error at all, and that the needs-based conclusion was a result of his exercise of 
discretion in deciding that he would limit the wife’s claim to needs alone, before then 
considering the impact of the prorogation clause.  
As a result of judicial law making it has been established that when considering a pre-nuptial 
agreement the court must take into account the principles of fairness and autonomy. In 
Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 the Supreme Court established that:  
 ‘The court should give effect to a nuptial agreement that is freely entered into by each party with a full 
appreciation of its implications unless in the circumstances prevailing it would not be fair to hold the parties 
to their agreement’ (para. [75]).  
Lady Hale dissented, and stated that this test was an ‘impermissible gloss upon the courts' 
statutory duties.’ (para. [138]). Furthermore, the Supreme Court set out, ‘The reason why the 
court should give weight to a nuptial agreement is that there should be respect for individual 
autonomy.’ (para. [78]). It is important to remember that these principles have been crafted by 
the judiciary in order to develop the law in this area in a logical way, without any intervention 
or guidance from Parliament. In order to assess the balance between fairness and autonomy, 
three further judge-made principles must be taken into consideration: needs, compensation and 
sharing. No hard and fast rules were established in Radmacher with regard to these principles, 
but the Supreme Court did go as far as to say that agreements which attempt to modify needs 
and compensation would be more likely to be considered to be unfair (para. [81]).  
In the High Court, Mr Justice Francis referred to Z v Z (No 2) (Financial Remedy: Marriage 
Contract) [2011] EWHC 22878 and Luckwell v Limata [2014] EWHC 502. In both of these 
cases all of the circumstances had been considered, the agreements had been upheld in so far 
as they excluded sharing and needs-based orders had been made. The Court of Appeal 
concluded that Mr Justice Francis had felt that he was in a ‘straitjacket’ as a result of 
considering these authorities and so approached the case on a needs only basis. (para. [100]). 
The Court of Appeal were careful to point out that they were not proposing that the wife should 
be provided with an award in excess of her needs, only that he should make an order which he 
considers to be fair, taking into account all of the circumstances. Lady Justice King also noted 
that when carrying out this assessment it would be usual to provide a settlement in excess of 
needs, contrary to the terms of the agreement, and that a settlement limited to needs would be 
more likely (para. [103]). Lady Justice King concluded with the sound advice to the couple that 
they should seek a resolution without further litigation, noting that ‘…the parties have 
subjected themselves and each other to punishing litigation for over 3 years and at a huge 
financial and emotional cost.’ (para. [108]).  
The case brings together a number of significant issues. It acts as a reminder as to the potential 
for uncertainty in this area and that the law surrounding pre-nuptial agreements is neither 
simple nor clear. The judiciary have created layers of principles that need to be weighed up in 
such cases. These developments have been regarded as controversial (Cretney 2003, Bailey-
Harris 2005 and Clark 2011), but the courts have been creative with their discretionary powers 
in the interests of achieving justice. However, Brack v Brack shows that further clarification is 
still required. The financial and emotional cost involved in such cases should not be ignored. 
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